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STARE DECISIS AND THE OVERRULING OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONS IN THE WARREN YEARS
JON D. NOLAND*
INTRODUCTION
The retirement of Chief Justice Warren coupled with the resign-
ation of Justice Fortas may signal the end of the most recent "activist"
era in the Supreme Court's history.' For example, it appears that
there may be some change in emphasis in the Court's decisions as well as
greater hesitancy to develop new doctrine and extend present doctrine.
Any further changes in the Court's personnel could lead to what Justice
Douglas has termed a "substantial unsettlement" in constitutional law
pending the determination by the new judges of their positions on con-
stitutional issues.2 The question of whether there will be wholesale
reversals of recent Supreme Court decisions has been much mooted in the
popular press.' The President, as well as others, is reported to have some
hope in this regard.' These accounts, however, have cautioned those
entertaining such expectations that the Court is not unrestrained by its
prior decisions. Fred P. Graham has written in the New York Times:
If the Warren Court's reforms were paraded back before them
the erstwhile dissenters might feel bound by the doctrine of
stare decisis (stand by settled cases) and would not be willing
to discard them so soon.
In fact, the "strict constructionists" that Mr. Nixon admires are
the least likely agents of constitutional upheaval. Justice Harlan,
who dissented against most of the landmark liberal cases, be-
lieves so strongly in stare decisis that he has recently written a
few liberal decisions himself-and has been chided by Justice
Hugo Black for hobbling law enforcement. '
It is not the purpose of this article to predict the future course of
decisions or to weigh the probabilities that specific decisions of the
* Member of the Indiana Bar.
1. "Activism" is used both in the sense of a willingness to accept cases as proper
for adjudication and a willingness to decide cases according to personal notions of what
is desirable. See generally Jaffe, Was Brandeis an Activist! The Search for Intermedi-
ate Premises, 80 HARv. L. REV. 986, 988 (1967).
2. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 736 (1949).
3. N.Y. Times, May 25, 1969, § 4, at 2, col. 5; TIME, July 4, 1969, at 62.
4. N.Y. Times. May 25, 1969, § 4, at 2, col. 6.
5. Id. at col. 7.
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Warren Court will or will not be reversed. However, it does seem
appropriate at this time to reassess the role of stare decisis in con-
stitutional adjudication and the process of reversal in the evolution and
growth of constitutional law, especially with reference to the Warren
years.6 It is to this task that we now turn.
HISTORY OF THE DOCTRINE OF STARE DECISIS
The Doctrine at Common Law
The doctrine of stare decisis arose from a desire for certainty and
continuity in the law. As early as Bracton and the Year Books of the
fourteenth century,' stare decisis has been termed "at least the everyday
working rule of our law"8 which must generally be adhered to "if
litigants are to have faith in the even-handed administration of justice in
the courts."' With one exception,"0 the doctrine has never called for
complete adherence to prior decisions. Blackstone's proposition was that
"precedents and rules must be followed, unless flatly absurd or unjust.""
Thus, in this statement, which is an overly restrictive definition of even
the English practice," both a static and a dynamic component are
recognized. The American common law doctrine has been well stated as
follows:
The general American doctrine behind stare decisis, then, is
that a court is not inexorably bound by its own precedents, but.
in the interests of uniformity of treatment to litigants, and of
stability and certainty in the law, a court will follow the rule of
law which it has established in earlier cases unless clearly con-
vinced that the rule was originally erroneous or is no longer
6. This is a subject that has been treated periodically in the law reviews. See gen-
erally Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
55 (1948) ; Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 151 (1958) ; Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Constitutional Theory, 8
N.Y.U.L.Q. REV. 589 (1931) ; Chamberlain, The Doctrine of Stare Decisis as Applied to
Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3 HARV. L. REV. 125 (1889) ; Douglas, Stare De-
cisis, 49 COLUM. L. REv. 735 (1949) ; Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, PA.
BAR Assoc. Q., April, 1938, at 131; Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Back-
ground of the Justices of the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. TORONTO L.J.
194 (1962) ; Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of Modified
and Overruled Decisions, 46 HARV. L. REV. 361. 593, 795 (1933).
7. von Moschzisker, Stare Decisis in Courts of Last Resort, 37 HARV. L. REV. 409
(1924).
8. B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 20, 34 (1960).
9. Id. at 34.
10. The House of Lords from 1861 to 1966 denied that it had authority to overrule
its prior decisions. Leach, Revisionism in the House of Lords: The Bastion of Rigid
Stare Decisis Falls, 80 HARV. L. REV. 797 (1967).
11. BLAcICKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW 42 (Gavit ed. 1892).
12. See PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAw 349 (5th ed. 1956).
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sound because of changed conditions and that more good than
harm would come by departing from precedent.'"
This formulation emphasizes that stare decisis, if it can be considered a
rule at all, is at most a rule of policy that requires the balancing of a
variety of factors in the process of deciding whether a particular precedent
or line of precedents should be followed or rejected." The dynamic
element of the doctrine is an acknowledgment of the fact that the law
must grow and conform to the norms, institutions and sense of justice
of the times if it is to command obedience and respect. The static element
reminds us that stability and certainty, rather than growth and change,
are often higher values and, in any event, that judge-made growth and
change must be incremental," interstitial and in harmony with the
continuum which is our history. Thus, Holmes did not offend the
common-law doctrine of stare decisis when he wrote that "imitation of the
past, until we have a clear reason for change, no more needs justification
than appetite."' 6 He further stated that
[i]t is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than
that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV.
[Especially] if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind
imitation of the past.'7
THE DOCTRINE IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
Rigid Stare Decisis
On occasion it has been stated that certainty and stability are as
important in constitutional law as in other kinds of law and that,
therefore, the doctrine of stare decisis should apply with equal weight in
constitutional cases."8 This has resulted in an excessive emphasis on the
13. Moore & Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and the Law of the Case.
21 TEX. L. REv. 514, 539-40 (1943). See generally Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10
FORDHAM L. REV. 1 (1941). Cardozo apparently believed that even this formulation was
at times too restrictive. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 150.
14. It was Hamilton's view that "to avoid an arbitrary discretion in the courts, it is
indispensable that they should be bound down by strict rules and precedents which serve
to define and point out their duty in every particular case that comes before them ....1"
THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 471 (Mentor ed. 1961) (A. Hamilton). The fact is that it
is for judges to say when they will be bound by precedents, but it does not follow that
they exercise an unbridled discretion. But see Hertz v. Woodman, 218 U.S. 205, 212
(1910).
15. For a discussion of the incremental nature of judicial decision making see
SHAPIRO, THE SUPREME COURT AND ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 73-91 (1968).
16. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 285, 290 (1920).
17. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 461, 469 (1897).
18. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS 79-89 (7th ed. 1903); Chamberlain,
The Doctrine of Stare Decisis As Applied to Decisions of Constitutional Questions, 3
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static element of the doctrine. The view of Mr. Justice Field in Pollock v.
Farmer's Loan & Trust Co. 9 was as follows:
The fundamental conception of a judicial body is that of one
hedged about by precedents which are binding on the court
without regard to the personality of its members. Break down
this belief in judicial continuity, and let it be felt that on great
constitutional questions this court is to depart from the settled
conclusions of its predecessors, and to determine them all
according to the mere opinion of those who temporarily fill its
bench, and our Constitution will, in my judgment, be bereft of
value and become a most dangerous instrument to the rights
and liberties of people. °
Justice Field's statement, which appears to be derived in part from
Hamilton's pronouncement,2 focuses on the static component of stare
decisis in an effort to confine judicial discretion within strict limits and
seemingly rejects any departure from the "settled" conclusions of prior
cases.22
This theory, which cannot be attributed solely to Justice Field, allows
little or no room for accommodation of the Constitution with the
changing mores and institutions of American life. It overlooks the
fundamental truth that the Constitution contains "not rules for the
passing hour, but principles for an expanding future."" Although it has
been argued otherwise, 4 the Constitution cannot be "interpreted as
though it were a private contract or a statute enacted for a peculiar,
temporary purpose."" Particular constitutional principles or certain ap-
HARV. L. REV. 125 (1889). Even the proponents of rigid stare decisis are outdone by
those holding the view that decisions of the Court become part of the Constitution itself
and may be changed only by formal amendment. Cf. United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S.
433, 438 (1922).
19. 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
20. Id. at 652. Two years earlier in a non-constitutional case Field wrote
that "it is more important that the court should be right upon later and more elaborate
consideration of the cases than consistent with previous declarations." Barden v. North-
ern Pacific R.R., 154 U.S. 288, 322 (1893).
21. See note 14 supra.
22. It has been argued that the doctrine of stare decisis is misapplied to constitu-
tional law because of the flexibility embodied in its dual nature. Long, The Doctrine of
Stare Decisis: Misapplied to Constitutional Law, 45 A.B.A.J. 921 (1959).
23. CARDOZO, supra note 8, at 83.
24. Brown, Construing the Constitution: A Trial Lawyer's Plea for Stare DecisL,
44 A.B.A.J. 742 (1958).
25. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 257 (1967). The
idea that constitutional decisions could be reached in this manner was persuasively re-
jected by James Bradley Thayer in his significant essay on judicial review. Thayer,
The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, 7 Hav. L. REv.
129 (1893).
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plications thereof may be correct for one period of our development and
yet incorrect for a future era. It is true that certain clauses of the Con-
stitution may have a fixed, technical meaning that is susceptible of only
one correct interpretation."6 However, most of the significant clauses
speak only in generalities whose substance and importance vary with the
course of history. Hence, their construction and application require more
than an .ascertainment of the framers' intent. This is demonstrated by the
first case in which a prior decision of the Court was expressly overruled.
In Thomas Jefferson"7 the Court had held that the jurisdiction of the
admiralty courts of the United States was limited, as was the jurisdiction
of the English admiralty courts, to the ebb and flow of the tide. At the
time there was little commerce on the rivers and lakes of the west. If such
commerce had not developed, the English rule would have accomplished
the purposes for which the jurisdiction was granted. However, the
development did occur, and the inadequacy of the rule became apparent.
Thus, in Propeller Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh28 the Court extended the
admiralty jurisdiction to lakes and other navigable waters. Rigid stare
decisis, because it fails to allow for such necessary changes and growth.
cannot function as a workable precept in constitutional adjudication.
The Denial of Stare Decisis
To be contrasted with the position of Justice Field as expressed in the
Pollock case is the opinion of Chief Justice Taney that a constitutional
decision "is always open to discussion when it is supposed to have been
founded in error"" and that the judicial authority of the Court should
"depend altogether on the force of the reasoning by which it is sup-
ported."" Another proponent of this view was Charles Warren who
denied that stare decisis can ever properly be applied in constitutional
cases since "the Judiciary should always be pervious to demonstration
of judicial error as to the original meaning of the Constitution, and
prepared to correct its own mistakes."'" This proposition rests on the
thesis that the Court must continually justify its decisions -by reference
to the language of the Constitution itself and that the Court's own pre-
cedents are not evidence of the meaning of that language. Its logic leads
one to the conclusion that stability, certainty and continuity fail to play a
meaningful role in constitutional adjudication since adherence to pre-
cedents depends entirely on their intrinsic "correctness." Therefore, con-
26. For Justice Frankfurter's views see notes 109-112 infra and accompanying text.
27. 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 358 (1825).
28. 53 U.S. (12 How.) 1058 (1851).
29. Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 702, 781 (1849).
30. Id. at 781.
31. 2 WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 748-49 (1926).
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stitutional doctrines that are determined to be "erroneous" should auto-
matically be rejected.
As Boudin has pointed out, only such a complete rejection of stare
decisis is compatible with our constitutional theory that declares "the
absolute lack of power of any department of government to act outside the
constitutional limits." 2 Indeed, this appears to have been the position
.taken in Erie R. R. v. Tompkins,3 where Justice Brandeis wrote for the
Court:
The injustice and confusion incident to the doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson have been repeatedly urged as reasons for abolishing or
limiting diversity of citizenship jursidiction. Other legislative
relief has been proposed. If only a question of statutory con-
struction were involved, we should not be prepared to abandon
a doctrine so widely applied throughout a century. But the un-
constitutionality of the course pursued has now been made clear
and compels us to do so."
The implication of this language is that there is no occasion for the con-
sideration of competing policies or of the political consequences of an
overruling decision where the question is one of constitutionality. Inherent
is such a concept is the assumption that there is only one "correct" inter-
pretation of the Constitution that, when "discovered," must be declared
and applied with evangelistic vigor while the "erroneous" views of
predecessors are dismissed with no little measure of intolerance."s
Obviously, competing considerations are completely submerged in the
face of such moral certainty. Therefore, in one sense, the theory underly-
ing the rejection of stare decisis is also overly rigid.
In addition, the denial of any effect of stare decisis in constitutional
cases only enhances the public image of the Court as a council of nine
wise men who rule solely by ipse dixit. If the Justices were in fact
infalible, this might be tolerable but, as Justice Jackson so tellingly
proclaimed: "We are not final because we are infallible, but we are
infallible only because we are final."3 Ultimately the Court's power rests
solely on its moral sanction which in turn rests on the belief and fact that
its decisions do not reflect merely the individual, arbitrary preferences of
32. Boudin, The Problem of Stare Decisis in Our Constitutional Theory, 8 N.Y.U.
L.Q. REV. 589. 594 (1931).
33. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
34. Id. at 77-78 (emphasis added). Brandeis. of course, recognized in other cases
that stare decisis does have some place in the decision of constitutional questions. Di
Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
35. See the dissenting opinion of Justice Roberts in Smith v. Allright. 321 U.S.
649, 666 (1944).
36. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443. 540 (1953) (concurring opinion).
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its members. This can be partially insured by requiring that the Court
pay some heed to the decisions of its predecessors. As Professor Cox has
written:
[T]he Court is to decide not by what is good, or just, or
wise, but according to law, according to a continuity of principle
found in the words of the Constitution, judicial precedents,
traditional understanding and like sources of law. 7
Therefore, the judge is usually confronted with the dilemma of deciding
constitutional cases through application of traditional judicial tools and
methods of reasoning while never losing sight of the political con-
sequences and results of his decisions. If it is properly understood and
applied, the doctrine of stare decisis can assist in the accomplishment of
both of these tasks.
The Intermediate Premise of Stare Decisis
Asa matter of practice as Boudin recognized," the doctrine of stare
decisis historically has been applied in constitutional cases, albeit less
rigoriously. One reason for the less rigorous application of the doctrine is
that the interest in promoting stability and certainty is frequently not so
urgent where great public interests are involved." Of course, it is true
that property rights are sometimes founded upon a particular constitution-
al principle, and in such a case, even though the Constitution is involved,
it may be "more important that a fule of law be settled, than that it be
settled right.""0 This policy may prevail, for example, where private
parties have engaged in a multitude of transactions in reliance upon the
rule that they are constitutionally immune from taxation.' Reliance may
also be placed upon decisions affirming governmental powers, as in
questions affecting the taxing powers of the states.2 In such instances,
the Court must determine that more harm will be done in rejecting than in
retaining the questioned rule. That judgment must be based "on very
practical and in part upon policy considerations.""3 However, the rejec-
tion of previously accepted constitutional doctrines will generally not
result in the frustration or denial of reasonable expectations arising from
37. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 21 (1967).
38. Boudin, supra note 32, at 619.
39. Contra, Chamberlain, supra note 18, at 130-31.
40. Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 42 (1927) ; accord United States v.
South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 579 (1944) (Stone, J., dissenting).
41. Cf. Helvering v. Griffiths, 318 U.S. 371 (1943).
42. Union Tank Line Co. v. Wright, 249 U.S. 275, 293-94 (1919) (dissenting
opinion). Cf. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
43. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533, 594 (1944)
(opinion of Jackson, J.).
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transactions based thereon." To the-extent that this is true, the primary
justification for adherence to precedents is inapplicable.
Moreover, in addition to the usual consideration, factors peculiar to
constitutional cases may be placed in the balance. The reasons which
dictate that less consideration be given to the static element of stare
decisis were well summarized by Mr. Justice (then Solicitor General)
Reed as follows:
In the constitutional field the rule should be most liberally
applied, because the court must test its conclusions by the
organic document, rather than precedent; because constitutional
doubts must be personal and present doubts, not those of others;
because legislation is often powerless to overcome questionable
constitutional decisions; and finally because of the extreme dif-
ficulty in rectifying judicial error by amendment."
To this list, of course, should be added Marshall's admonition that "it is
a constitution we are expounding." 6
All would substantially agree with the validity of Justice Reed's
statement. Constitutional decisions must plainly be explicable in terms of
the language of the Constitution. Concededly, it is difficult to change the
Constitution through the process of formal amendment. 7 On the other
hand, it is perplexing to consider constitutional doubts more personal
than doubts concerning non-constitutional doctrines. One of the earliest
proponents of this theory was Mr. Justice Daniel, who in the License
Cases"8 declared:
[I]n matters involving the meaning and integrity of the Con-
stitution, I never can consent that the text of that instrument
shall be overlaid and smothered by the glosses of essay writers,
lecturers, and commentators. Nor will I abide the decisions of
judges. believed by me to be invasions of the great lex legum.
I, too, have been sworn to observe and maintain the Constitu-
tion. I possess no sovereign prerogative by which I can put my
44. The Court so found, for example, in The Propeller Genesee Chief v. Fitzhugh.
53 U.S. (12 How.) 1058 (1851). But see Marshall v. The Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57
U.S. (16 How.) 953 (1853) : "There are no cases, where an adherence to the maxim of
'stare decisis' is so absolutely necessary to the peace of society, as those which affect
retroactively the jurisdiction of courts." Id. at 958. The disruptive effects of the retro-
active application of overruling decisions have been eliminated, particularly in the crimi-
nal area, by denying any retroactive effect to such decisions.
45. Reed, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Law, PA. BAR Assoc. Q., April, 1938, at
134.
46. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 579, 602 (1819).
47. This point is made in WILLOUGHB, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES 52 (1910).
48. 46 U.S. (5 How.) 272 (1847).
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conscience into commission. I must interpret exclusively as that
conscience shall dictate. 9
The logic of this theory ultimately leads, as did Taney's, to a complete
rejection of state decisis. It rests on the assumption that each Justice is a
"solitary philosopher"5 who need not show tolerance for what his
brethren before him decided and who has no responsibility for convincing
the other Justices of the validity of his position or for the actions of the
Court as a durable institution. As a matter of practice, however, Justices
have been willing, at least in part, to put aside their personal views once
it is clear that a majority of their colleagues have found them unpersua-
sive. Frequently, this results in separate concurrences solely on the
ground of stare decisis.? If matters of conscience can yield to the honestly
held opinions of others and to the demands of stare decisis in this
situation, it would seem that there should be equal room for compromise
as the Court proceeds to reach its collective judgment in the first instance.
Furthermore, the decision making process must involve more than a
confrontation among the facts at issue, the Constitution and the Justices'
unburdened conscience. The full panoply of political, economic and social
considerations must be present in his mind.5 2
There are a series of objective factors against which the judge can
and should measure the dictates of his conscience. These are not directly
related to the substantive validity of the doctrine in question, but rather to
the process underlying the decision and the age and nature thereof.
Nevertheless, they are relevant to the precedential value of a decision. For
example, the age of a decision may foretell not only the degree of reliance
that has been placed upon it, but also the effect of an overruling on the
institution of the Court itself. 3 These considerations often work in
opposite directions. The prime example, of course, is the Legal Tender
Cases54 in which Hepburn v. Griswold,5 decided just one year before,
49. Id. at 305.
50. Cf. Chafee, Book Review, 62 HARV. L. REv. 891, 901 (1949).
51. Murphy v. Sardell, 269 U.S. 530 (1925) (Holmes, J., concurring) ; Door v.
United States, 195 U.S. 138, 153-54 (1904) (Peckham, J., concurring). Justices have
sometimes not felt so constrained where later cases purport to reexamine and reaffirm
the grounds of the prior decision. St. Joseph Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 93-94
(Stone & Cardozo, J.J., concurring). Compare the concurring opinion of Justice Har-
lan in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969) with the dissent of Justice Stewart in the
same case.
52. Professor Jaffe has written: "[A] judge who listens only to the still, small
voice of his own conscience should get himself to a monastery." Jaffe, Was Brandeis an
Activist? The Search for Intermediate Premises, 80 HARv. L. REV. 986, 998 (1967).
53. Contra, Chamberlain, supra note 18, at 129.
54. 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 287 (1871).
55. 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 513 (1870).
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was overruled." With respect to the propriety of this action, it was the
opinion of Mr. Justice Bradley that:
Where the decision is recent, and is only made by a bare
majority of the court, and during a time of public excitement
on the subject, when the question has largely entered into the
political discussions of the day, I consider it our right and duty
to subject it to a further examination, if a majority of the court
are dissatisfied with the former decision."'
By the same token, such reversals, when made by a bare majority of the
Court, "do no service to the idea of law as something distinct from politics
and the arbitrary preferences of individuals.""8
In addition to the age of the decision, it is pertinent to consider
whether the precedent was set by a sharply divided Court or by a
unanimous Court and whether the question at issue was elaborately
argued and fully considered. A doctrine that has consistently provoked a
series of dissents may be more readily overruled than one that has
historically enjoyed the full assent of the Court.59 This is illustrated by the
extreme cases in which affirmance by an equally divided court "is with-
out force as precedent."6 Similarly, decisions by a minority of the Court
are not entitled to precedential effect.61 In the same vein, a single decision
has never been regarded as binding as a series of decisions. Likewise, a
proposition enunciated without full argument and careful deliberation may
be entitled to less consideration than one developed through the normal
adversary procedure.6 "
To the above factors, which obviously require the Court to use a
complex thematic approach to the problem of stare decisis, Justice Bran-
deis added a new element. In his famous dissenting opinion in Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 3 the Justice wrote:
The reasons why this Court should refuse to follow an earlier
constitutional decision which it deems erroneous are particularly
56. See generally Sachs, Stare Decisis and the Legal Tender Cases, 20 VA. L. REV.
856 (1934).
57. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 287 (1871).
58. Cox, supra note 37, at 21; cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 666 (1944)
(Roberts, J., dissenting).
59. Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 499, 500 (1869) (dis-
senting opinion).
60. Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 264 (1960).
61. Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 47 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
generally Comment, Supreme Court No-Clear-Majority Decisions: A Study in Stare
Decisis, 24 U. CHi. L. REV. 99 (1956).
62. Cf. Seibert v. United States, 129 U.S. 192 (1889) ; Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 339 (1871) (Field, J., dissenting).
63. 285 U.S. 393 (1932).
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strong where the question presented is one of applying, as dis-
tinguished from what may accurately be called interpreting, the
Constitution. In the cases which now come before us there is
seldom any dispute as to the interpretation of any provision. The
controversy is usually over the application to existing con-
ditions of some well-recognized constitutional limitation. This
is strikingly true of cases under the due process clause when
the question is whether a statute is unreasonable, arbitrary
or capricious; of cases under the equal protection clause when
the question is whether there is any reasonable basis for the
classification made by a statute; and of cases under the com-
merce clause when the question is whether an admitted burden
laid by a statute upon interstate commerce is so substantial as to
be deemed direct. These issues resemble, fundamentally, that of
reasonable care in negligence cases, the determination of which
is ordinarily left to the verdict of the jury."
The distinction between interpretation and application, although not
entirely free from difficulty, is based on the hypothesis that application is
dependent upon the ascertainment of facts, existing conditions and pre-
vailing views regarding economic and social policy, all of which may vary
in a later decision or become subject to fresh and independent con-
siderations. Indeed, these were among the arguments marshalled by
Chief Justice Hughes in his opinion for the Court in West Coast Hotel
Co. v. Parrish," which upheld the constitutionality of the Washington
minimum wage law, overruled Adkins v. Children's Hospital8 and
marked the beginning of the so-called "revolution" of 1937, in which the
Court, in a series of reversals, virtually eliminated itself from any con-
trol over economic policies promulgated by the political branches. The
Chief Justice also found that the Adkins case itself departed from the
earlier decisions of the Court. Speaking for the four dissenters, Justice
Sutherland, in language reminiscent of Justice Daniels, emphasized that
constitutional doubts are individual doubts and disputed the proposition
that the Constitution can assume a meaning contrary to that intended by
the framers. It is against this background and at this crucial time in
the nation's and the Court's history that the first of the Justices to serve
during the Warren years was appointed. 7
64. Id. at 410; accord, Pound, What of Stare Decisis?, 10 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 11
(1941). The distinction was accepted by the Court in Smith 'v. Allwright, 321 U.S.
649, 665-66 (1944).
65. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
66. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
67. Justice Black was nominated for the Court on August 12, 1937, and he took
his seat on October 4, 1937.
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The Doctrine During the Warren Years
The historic divisions among the members of the Court with
respect to the proper role of stare decisis in constitutional cases continued
throughout the Warren years. In essence, this controversy was a part of
the larger disagreement on the proper role of the judiciary that made the
Warren Court the most divided Court in our history.8 An analysis of
the views of each Justice during this period would be neither useful nor
possible since it would result in pure conjecture as to those Justices who
did not, or have not, articulated their positions on this issue with any
degree of completeness. It does seem apparent, however, that there were
no proponents of rigid stare decisis on the Warren Court. Within this
broad area of agreement three different philosophies, represented by
Justices Douglas, Black and Frankfurter, are discernible. The ensuing
analysis, therefore, is concentrated on the views of these Justices.
Justice Douglas
Justice Douglas recognizes that stare decisis plays an important role
in private law, where "uniformity and continuity in law are necessary to
many activities."6 He finds little or no place, however, for application of
the doctrine in constitutional law. For the Justice, "happily, all con-
stitutional questions are always open."70 This condition is the result of
three factors which dictate a different treatment for consititutional cases.
In the first place, the Constitution states principles that "are designed not
for one era only but for the vicissitudes of time."'" This requires that
stare decisis "give way before the dynamic component of history." 2
Secondly, a judge is sworn to support and defend the Constitution, not
the interpretation that his predecessors have given to it, and those in-
terpretations that appear "false" to him must be rejected." Finally, the
"reexamination of precedent in constitutional law is a personal matter for
each judge who comes along,"74 or, in Justice Daniel's terminology, it is a
matter of "conscience."
Although Justice Douglas does not forthrightly reject any role for
stare decisis in constitutional adjudication, one is struck by the absence
from his extrajudicial writings of any discussion of those factors which a
68. Kurland, Earl Warren, The "Warren Court" and The Warren Myths, 67
MicH. L. REV. 353, 355 (1968).
69. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM L. REV. 735 (1949) ; cf. Screws v. United
States, 325 U.S. 91, 112 (1945).
70. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 346 (1963) (concurring opinion).
71. DOUGLAS, WE THE JUDGES 429 (1956).
72. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 737 (1949).
73. Id. at 736.
74. Id.
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judge should consider in his personal reexamination of precedents. The
following passage from the Justice's dissenting opinion in Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok9 indicates that he is willing to invoke the traditional arguments
on appropriate occasions:
I mention the two regimes that filed the unanimous opinions in
those cases to indicate the vintage of the authority which
decided them. Their decisions, of course, do not bind us, for they
dealt with matters of constitutional interpretation which are
always open. Yet no new history has been unearthed to show
that the Taft and Hughes Courts were wrong on the technical,
but vitally important, question now presented. 8
Nevertheless, there is no independent reliance on stare decisis in this
language, but merely an appeal to the precedents to lend support to a
conclusion otherwise reached. The Justice would undoubtedly disagree
with the proposition that a judge, because of.the presence of the factors
which he enumerates, should follow a constitutional precedent when he
regards the rule announced therein as erroneous. Rather, it is reasonable
to infer from his writings that, in such a case, the judge should and must
follow his private judgment. Thus, at the most, past decisions of the
Court can give the judge only a "sense of the continuity of a society...
and of the origins of principles" and "a feel for the durability of a
doctrine."77 As a practical matter, therefore, it appears that Justice
Douglas denies that stare decisis has any independent significance in con-
stitutional cases. 8
Justice Black
Justice Black accepts the proposition that stare decisis is not an
inexorable command in constitutional cases79 since "the Court has a
special responsibility where questions of constitutional law are involved
to review its decisions from time to time and where compelling reasons
present themselves to refuse to follow erroneous precedents . ".. .80 The
Justice appears to acknowledge, however, that where justified expectations
75. 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In this case, three members of the Court rejected the
decisions in Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929) and Williams v. United States,
289 U.S. 553 (1933), pertaining to the Article III status of the Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals and Court of Claims.
76. Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 592 (1933). Justice Douglas dis-
sented in only one other overruling case, Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), dur-
ing the Warren years.
77. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUMt. L. REv. 735, 739 (1949).
78. See Armstrong, Mr. Justice Douglas on Stare Decisis: A Condensation of the
Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 35 A.B.A.J. 541 (1949).
79. James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213. 233 (1961).
80. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (dissenting opinion).
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would be destroyed or where there has been a heavy investment in
reliance on earlier cases the doctrine may call for an adherence to
precedents."' The application of these generalities is deeply influenced by
the Justice's philosophy that "the problem of adapting the Constitution
to meet new needs [should be left] to constitutional amendments ap-
proved by the people under constitutional procedures." 2 While recogniz-
ing that "it is a constitution we are expounding," 8 his interpretation is
based primarily on language and history. 4 It seems paradoxical that he
would agree with the viewpoint of Justice Sutherland who, dissenting in
West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,"5 wrote:
We frequently are told in more general words that the Con-
stitution must be construed in the light of the present. If by
that is meant that the Constitution is made up of living words
that apply to every new condition which they include, the state-
ment is quite true. But to say, if that be intended, that the words
of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when
written-that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to
which they would have applied then-is to rob that instrument
of the essential element which continues it in force as the people
have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made
it otherwise.8"
Pursuant to these views, Justice Black does not hesitate to call for
the overruling of precedents that he finds to be contrary to his reading of
history and the language of the Constitution. This was made clear by his
dissenting opinion in Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson,"7
where he urged the Court to overrule previous decisions that interpreted
the Fourteenth Amendment to include corporations.88 In his dissent the
Justice gave no consideration to the age of this doctrine, to its role in the
economic life of the nation or to the possible consequences of such a
reversal. It was enough that "a constitutional interpretation that is
81. Id. at 197.
82. BLACK, A CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH xvi (1968).
83. Id. at 8.
84. Id.
85. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
86. Id. at 402-03. Professor Jaffee has also found a certain kinship between Jus-
tices Black and Sutherland. Jaffee, supro note 52, at 996.
87. 303 U.S. 77 (1938).
88. Justice Douglas, joined by Justice Black, dissented on similar grounds in
Wheeling Steel Corp. z. Glander, 337 U.S. 562 (1949) and WHYY, Inc. v. Borough of
Glassboro, 393 U.S. 117 (1968) where the Court held that a foreign corporation was pro-
tected from a discriminatory tax under the equal protection clause, Justice Black dis-
sented without opinion.
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wrong should not stand." 9
On the other hand, Justice Black is a strong supporter of precedents
that in his view are correct, particularly when he believes the Court is
changing the Constitution by overturning them. Thus, he dissented in
Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections,"0 which condemned the
Virginia poll tax, because the Court went beyond its power to interpret
the original meaning of the equal protection clause. Similarly, in Katz
v. United States"' he was unable to construe the language of the Fourth
Amendment to apply to eavesdropping.
While many other judges have sought guidance and restraint in the
doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Black finds his guidance and restraint in
the history and language of the Constitution. The factors and policies
underlying stare decisis play little role in his intellectual processes. It does
not appear to disturb him that the true meaning of the Constitution is
often not revealed to other Justices as it is to him.
Justice Frankfurter
Justice Frankfurter, more than any Other Justice during the Warren
years, was concerned with the problems of judicial self-restraint and the
proper role of stare decisis in constitutional adjudication. The Justice
fully realized that stare decisis is less compelling in constitutional cases
since "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution
itself"" and since the Court "bears the ultimate obligation for the develop-
ment of the law as institutions develop.""8 Nevertheless, reversals "must
be by orderly process of law" 4 and "should not derive from mere
private judgment."'" Thus, the horns of the dilemma are clearly bared,
and the Justice attempted to chart his way between them, in part, by
relying on his conception of stare decisis.
Justice Frankfurter, of course, perceived that stare decisis is a
"principle of policy and not a mechanical formula" 6 that requires the
delicate balancing of a variety of factors. He brought to this task a keen
sense of history which reminded him that the Court seldom wrote on a
89. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 303 U.S. 77, 85 (1938).
90. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
91. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
92. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 491 (1939) (concurring opinion).
93. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 202 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
94. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 308 (1947) (concurring
opinion).
95. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939).
96. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119 (1940).
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clean slate," although he recognized that a single decision"8 or a few
sporadic decisions9 could not check the Court's power to examine an
issue from a fresh viewpoint and with an eye on the present. Where,
however, a uniform course of decisions held that the ex post facto clause
had no application to deportation, he was unwilling to disregard prece-
dent, although as a first impression he might have decided the question
otherwise.100
In measuring the intrinsic authority of precedents, Justice Frank-
furter was often less concerned with the substantive rules announced
therein than with the process by which the decisions were reached and
with the Justices who reached them. Thus, he was more reluctant to
question or overrule a case that had been comprehensively briefed and
argued and thoroughly debated by the Court."' On the other hand,
where he believed an important question had not been adequately con-
sidered, he wrote:
[T]he relevant demands of stare decisis do not preclude con-
sidering, for the first time thoroughly and in the light of the
best available evidence of congressional purpose, a statutory
interpretation which started as an unexamined assumption on the
basis of inapplicable citations and has the claim of a dogma
solely through reiteration." 2
The Justice's concern for the decision-making process is exemplified by
his unusual action in Reid v. Covert... and Kinsella v. Krueger,' in
which he refused to vote or render an opinion on the grounds that the
questions had not been adequately considered and that the Court's
decision should have been deferred until the following term.
With respect to issues concerning human rights, Justice Frankfurter
often refused to question decisions by those judges who he regarded as
having been "most zealous in protecting civil liberties under the Con-
stitution."' °  Thus, in Gore v. United States, ' 6 which upheld the
97. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); accord, Abbate v. United States,
359 U.S. 187, 190 (1959) (Brennan, J.), Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39, 76
(1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
98. Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (concurring opinion).
99. Toucey v. New York, 314 U.S. 118, 140 (1941).
100. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); cf. United States v. Barnett, 376
U.S. 681 (1964); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1954) (Clark, J., con-
curring).
101. Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59 (1947) (concurring opinion).
102. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 220-21 (1961) (dissenting opinion).
103. 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
104. 351 U.S. 470 (1956).
105. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 532 (1952).
106. 357 U.S. 386 (1958).
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legality of multiple consecutive sentences for separate sales of narcotics,
he wrote for the Court:
What is more to the point about the Blockburger decision is
that the unanimous Court that rendered it then included three
Justices conspicuous for their alertness in safeguarding the
interests of defendants in criminal cases and in their insistence
on the compassionate regard for such interests." 7
The Justice considered Holmes and Brandeis as "the originators and
formulators of the body of our present constitutional law pertaining to
civil liberties," ' and, therefore, was always reluctant to overturn one
of their decisions. Of necessity, this philosophy reflected extremely per-
sonal views held by the Justice and did not command any significant
respect from his colleagues. Indeed, one suspects that Holmes and Bran-
deis themselves would have preferred that the protections they were able
to achieve for personal liberties in a hostile period, the formulation of
which were undoubtedly weakened as the result of necessary com-
promises and accommodations, be expanded in accordance with new
conditions and beliefs.
Justice Frankfurter, as did Brandeis before him, emphasized the
nature of the constitutional rule involved in determining what, effect
should be given to stare decisis.1"9 Frankfurter's distinction, however,
was not between interpretation and application, but rather between
clauses with a fixed, historical meaning and those designed to expand or
contract with the vicissitudes of time. Thus, for the Justice the privilege
against self-incrimination was not "one of the vague, undefinable, ad-
monitory provisions of the Constitution whose scope is inevitably ad-
dressed to changing circumstances," but "a specific provision of which it
is peculiarly true that 'a page of history is worth a volume of logic'." '
Similarly, the limits of the defense of double jeopardy are fixed by history
and are not subject to change in the manner of the due process clause."'
It can not be denied that certain clauses of the Constitution have a more
ascertainable and definite historical meaning than others. Nevertheless,
one may question whether the Court should regard its role as finished
once the historical materials have been fully exposed and some consensus
107. Id. at 388-89.
108. Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 233 (1960) (dissenting opinion).
109. See also Lee v. Florida, 392 U.S. 378, 389 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
110. Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 438 (1956) ; cf. Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39, 76-77 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
111. Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 215 (1957) (dissenting opinion).
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reached as to the central meaning revealed therein.11
The above discussion outlines only the broad details of Justice
Frankfurter's conception of the role of stare decisis in constitutional
cases. He found no rules to guide his judgment in applying the doctrine,
but by weighing those factors that he considered relevant he was able to
suppress reading his own preferences into the Constitution. The clash of
this philosophy with the Douglas-Black approach is reflected in many of
the overruling cases of the Warren years.
OVERRULINGS IN THE WARREN YEARS
The Statistics
It is undoubtedly true that many, if not most, significant changes
in constitutional law occur through the process of qualifying, distinguish-
ing or expanding precedents without express or implied... overrulings
of decisions.114 Nevertheless, overruling cases "do represent the most
unambiguous manifestations of change.""'1 In addition to providing
some objective measure of the respect accorded to the doctrine of stare
decisis during a particular period, an analysis of overruling and overruled
cases may indicate those substantive areas in which change has been
concentrated.
The process of identifying "overruling" and "overruled" cases is not
an easy one. It is impossible to rely on case headnotes or on Shepard's
since these sources indicate only those cases which are expressly over-
ruled by the Court. Accordingly, the cases and statistics set forth herein
are derived from an examination of the official reports and an attempt has
been made to list not only express overrulings, but also overrulings by
implication. Decisions that have sought to distinguish a precedent on
any tenable ground have not been reported as overruling cases. For
example, the Court in Baker v. Carr"6 distinguished Colegrove v.
Green... on the ground that the question of justiciability relied on by
three Justices therein was not applicable to the apportionment of state
112. This in itself may be a difficult task. Frederick Bernays Wiener has written
with some justification that "in the field of history . . . a judicial opinion has neither
finality nor infallibility." WIENER, BRIEFING AND ARGUING FEDERAL APPEALS 187 (1967).
113. A prior decision of the Supreme Court may be overruled by implication.
Commissioner v. Church, 335 U.S. 632, 745 (1948).
114. See generally Sharp, Movement in Supreme Court Adjudication-A Study of
Modified and Overruled Decisions, 46 HARV. L. REV. 361, 593, 795 (1933). Statistics
show that "the greater number of instances in which the case is distinguished the less
likely the case will be overruled." Ulmer, An Empirical Analysis of Selected Aspects of
Lawmaking of the United States Supreme Court, 8 J. PUB. LAw 414, 430 (1959).
115. Schmidhauser, Stare Decisis, Dissent, and the Background of the Justices of
the Supreme Court of the United States, 14 U. OF TORONTO L.J. 194, 196 (1962).
116. 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
117. 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
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legislatures, although it previously had been so applied."' The Cole-
grove doctrine, therefore, retained some vitality until Wesberry v.
Sanders,"' where it was given a complete burial. Thus, Wesberry v.
Sanders is listed as an overruling case, but Baker v. Carr is not.'
During the sixteen Terms encompassed by the Warren years,12'
thirty decisions can be identified as overruling thirty-six previous cases
on constitutional grounds.122 These decisions are distributed by Term
as follows:
1954 - 1 1960 - 2 1964 - 3
1956 - 3 1961 - 1 1965 - 2
1957- 1 1962 - 1 1966 - 4
1959 - 1 1963 - 4 1967 - 3
1968 - 4
It is significant that twenty (over 55 percent) of the overruling decisions
were handed down in the last six Terms and that eleven (30 percent)
were handed down in the last three Terms. A comparison of these
figures with those derived in previous studies shows that the Warren
years were active ones, if such overturnings can be used as one measure
of activism. For example, Justice Douglas found that eight constitutional
decisions were overruled between 1860 and 1890 and that twenty-one
such decisions were overruled between 1937 and March, 1949.12 Other
commentators have found sixty overruling cases in the constitutional law
area between 1810 and 1956124 and thirty-five reversals in constitutional
cases between 1844 and 1946.1 Thus, it appears that before the 1953
Term the Court rendered an overruling opinion in a constitutional case
approximately every two and one-half years. The Warren Court, on the
other hand, averaged almost two overruling decisions per Term.12
The average age of the overruled cases is twenty-six years. Nine of
118. Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956).
119. 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
120. Technically, since Justice Frankfurter did not speak for a majority of the
Court in Colegrove, his opinion was not entitled to precedential effect.
121. Chief Justice Warren served under a recess appointment from October 5,
1953, until March 2, 1954. His nomination was sent to the Senate on January 11, 1954,
and the nomination was confirmed on March 1, 1954.
122. The New York Times has reported that the Warren Court, as of May 25,
1969, had made 45 reversals, but this figure is not limited to constitutional cases. N.Y.
Times, May 25, 1969, § 4, at 2. col. 7.
123. Douglas, Stare Decisis, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 735, 739, 743 (1949).
124. Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MicH. L.
REV. 151, 167 (1958).
125. Bernhardt, Supreme Court Reversals on Constitutional Issues, 34 CORNELL L.Q.
55, 56-59 (1948).
126. It should be noted that the number of overruled cases during the Warren years
is not disproportionate to that reported by Justice Douglas for the period of 1937-1949.
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the cases overruled (25 percent), however, were decided after Chief
Justice Warren assumed his duties.
The impact of the overrulings during the Warren years was felt
mainly by the states. Fully seventeen of these cases (47 percent) in-
volved some aspect of the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies to the
states. Of the thirty-six overruling decisions, eighteen pertained to
criminal procedure and the protection of the rights of an accused, six
cases involved the Fourth Amendment, eight dealt with the Fifth
Amendment and four with the Sixth Amendment. These statistics
demonstrate, as Professor Cox has written, that "the Warren Court
has been extraordinarily 'activist' in the field of criminal procedure."12
Furthermore, if the cases applying the provisions of the Bill of Rights
to the states can be classified as involving interpretation rather than
application in the Brandeis dichotomy, at least eight overruling cases
have involved the interpretation of the Constitution.
As every casual observer of the Court's work knows, the reversals
of the Warren years were far from unanimous. The following table shows
the distribution of votes in the thirty overruling decisions:










There were sixty-seven dissenting votes in the overuling cases, an average
of 2.2 per case. The total number of dissenting votes in the overruled cases
is eighty-four or an average of 2.3 per case. In eight of the overruled cases
(22 percent) and six (20 percent) of the overruling cases there were no
dissents. Only two of the overruled cases were reversed by a unanimous
court, whereas two were overturned by 6-3 votes, two by 5-2 votes, one
by a 5-4 vote and one by an 8-1 vote. The number of overruling cases
in which each Justice dissented is shown by the following table:
Justice Number of Dissents
Harlan 17
127. Cox, THE WARREN COURT 87-88 (1967).
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Justice Frankfurter leads the list of the Justices who wrote overruling
opinions with four. He is followed by Justices Clark and Minton with
three each and by Justices Peckham, Roberts, Reed and Harlan with
two each.
The Process of Overruling
To a large extent, M'app v. Ohio'28 marks the beginning of the
federalization of state criminal procedure through the process of selective
incorporation of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment.
Mapp, of course, overruled Wolf v. Colorado129 and held that all evidence
obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is
inadmissible in state courts. Although most observers would agree that
the Wolf rule was a dismal failure, there is much to be regretted in the
method and occasion the Court chose to announce its demise. The
appellant in Mapp urged only that an Ohio statute making criminal the
mere knowing prosession or control of obscene material, was uncon-
stitutional."' Counsel for Mrs. Mapp did not argue either in his brief or
oral argument that Wolf should be overruled. In fact, Wolf was not even
cited in his brief and he disclaimed any intent of urging its reversal during
oral argument. The brief of the American and Ohio Civil Liberties
Unions, as amici, did request that Wolf be re-examined and overruled.
This was also urged in oral argument. The brief, however, dealt with this
issue in ninety-one words without argumentation of any kind. Justice
Clark, writing for the Court, did not discuss the propriety of the Court's
reversal of Wolf in this posture of the case. Justice Douglas, concurring,
relied on the facts that the issue was raised, that argument in cases before
the Court is often concentrated on issues other than those which the
Court regards as decisive, that the arguments for overruling Wolf had
often been presented to the Court and that the facts of the case made it
128. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
129. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
130. This question was finally decided in Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
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especially appropriate for overruling Wolf.' ' All of these arguments
miss the mark. While the issue was raised, it was raised in the most
tangential and abbreviated way. Although the arguments for overruling
Wolf had been made before, the Court had always rejected them. Justice
Harlan's statement that five members of the Court "simply 'reached out'
to overrule Wolf""' is completely accurate. His further argument, as
follows, is unanswerable:
I would think that our obligation to the States, on whom we
impose this new rule, as well as the obligation of orderly
adherence to our own processes would demand that we seek that
aid which adequate briefing and argument lends to the deter-
mination of an important issue. It certainly has never been a
postulate of judicial power that mere altered disposition, or
subsequent membership on the Court, is sufficient warrant for
overturning a deliberately decided rule of Constitutional law.
Thus, if the Court were bent on reconsidering Wolf,
I think that there would soon have presented itself an ap-
propriate opportunity in which we could have had the benefit
of full briefing and argument. In any event, at the very least,
the present case should have been set down for reargument,
in view of the inadequate briefing and argument we have
received on the Wolf point. To all intents and purposes the
Court's present action amounts to a summary reversal of Wolf,
without argument.
I am bound to say that what has been done is not likely
to promote respect either for the Court's adjudicatory process
or for the stability of its decisions. 3
As previously discussed,'34 the precedential value of a decision may
partially rest on the thoroughness with which the question was con-
sidered. All constitutional questions should be thoroughly argued and
considered. This is particularly true when the continued validity of an
accepted constitutional doctrine that involves delicate problems of federa-
lism is being decided. The conclusion is unavoidable that in Mapp the
Court acted, not like nine, but like five wise men.
The action of the Court in Mapp is to be contrasted with the
131. 367 U.S. 643, 671 (1961).
132. Id. at 674.
133. Id. at 667. The same arguments were made by Justice Butler in his dissenting
opinion in Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
134. See notes 128-33 supra and accompanying text.
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restraint shown by Justice Brennan in Carnley v. Cochran,x"' where,
if he had joined Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Douglas,
Betts v. Brady"8' could have been overruled by at least a vote of 4-3.'3T
One year earlier, in McNeal v. Culver,"8 Justice Brennan had joined in
the concurring opinion of Justice Douglas in which the latter wrote that
Betts was "so at war with our concept of equal justice under law that it
should be overruled." ' The opinion expressly rejected the notion that
Betts should not be overruled until an indigent was able to show that the
absence of counsel prejudiced him. Justice Brennan, however, declined to
adhere to this position in Carnley. As Anthony Lewis has written:
Perhaps he felt it inappropriate to overrule a constitutional
decision with less than a full bench present, when the result
might be said to depend on the accident of vacant seats. Or
perhaps he or others thought the grave step of overruling
should be taken more deliberately, with counsel in some future
case being explicitly directed to focus on the question of the
Betts doctrine's continuing validity.'
It seems unfortunate that the same restraint shown in overruling
Betts was not exercised by Justices Harlan, Brennan and Stewart in
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok."' The question in that case was whether the
Court of Customs and Patent Appeals and Court of Claims were Article
III or Article I courts.' In Ex parte Bakelite Corp.4 ' and Williams v.
United States'" unanimous Courts held that both had been created under
Article I. Subsequently, Congress provided that "such court is hereby
declared to be a court established under Article III of the Constitution of
the United States."' 5 Justices Clark and Warren said that Congress, by
this legislation, successfully converted the tribunals into Article III courts.
Justices Harlan, Brennan and Stewart, however, reading the statutes as
a declaration of the original congressional intent, took the occasion to
135. 369 U.S. 506 (1962).
136. 316 U.S. 455 (1942). In Carnley, four Justices, including Justice Brennan,
found, without overruling Betts, that counsel was required by the particular facts of the
case.
137. Justice Whittaker had resigned and Justice Frankfurter was in the hospital.
138. 365 U.S. 109 (1961).
139. Id. at 119.
140. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 116-17 (1964).
141. 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
142. See generally Greenebaum & Wirtz, Separation of Powers: The Phenomenon
of Legislative Courts, 42 IND. L.J. 153 (1967).
143. 279 U.S. 438 (1929).
144. 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
145. Court of Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (1964) ; Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals Act, 28 U.S.C. § 211 (1964).
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disapprove the unanimous decisions in Bakelite and Williams. Justice
Harlan, writing for the three, declared:
Furthermore, apart from this Court's considered practice
not to apply stare decisis as rigidly in constitutional as in non-
constitutional cases.... there is the fact that Congress has acted
on its understanding and has provided for assignment of judges
who have made decisions that are now said to be impeachable.
In these circumstances, the practical consideration underlying
the doctrine of stare decisis-protection of generated expect-
tions-actually militates in favor of reexamining the decisions.
We are well-advised, therefore, to regard the questions decided
in those cases as entirely open to reconsideration." 6
Contrary to the implication of this language., the expectations involved
were equally protected by the rationale of Justice Clark's opinion. Further-
more, even if one accepts Justice Harlan's analysis of the congressional
understanding,4 7 the reconsideration and disapproval of Bakelite and
Williams was avoidable. Nevertheless, it was possible for the Justice to
limit his opinion to the dates of the enactments. Just as decisions of
constitutional questions should be avoided if possible, so should unneces-
sary overrulings and disapprovals of earlier decisions. This is particularly
true when undertaken by only three Justices. As Justice Fortas reportedly
said, speaking of his role as counsel for Gideon, if an important con-
stitutional case is to be overruled, it is "right for the institution of the
Supreme Court, and for the law, to have as much unanimity as
possible."'l 8
If Mapp and Zdanok are examples of a lack of judicial restraint
in overruling and disapproving cases, Carroll v. Lanza... is an illustra-
tion of the opposite tendency. Dissenters have frequently complained that
rejection of precedents should be accomplished clearly and forthrightly."'
The Carroll decision is peculiarly subject to this criticism. The story
begins with Bradford Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper,"' which involved
a wrongful death action brought in a New Hampshire federal court by
the personal representative of a deceased employee. The employee died of
an injury received in New Hampshire, but the employment contract was
146. 370 U.S. at 543.
147. There appear to be some problems in this reasoning. For example, is the
declaration of a later Congress as to the intent and understanding of an earlier Con-
gress always binding on the Court?
148. LEwis, GIDEON'S TRUMPET 119 (1964).
149. 349 U.S. 408 (1955).
150. See Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960) (Black, J.. dissenting) : Jencks
v. United States, 353 U.S. 657 (1957) (Clark, J., dissenting).
151. 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
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made in Vermont. Both the employer and employee were domiciled in
Vermont. The Vermont Workmen's Compensation Act provided that the
injury or death of an employee subject to the Act, wherever suffered,
would be compensated for only as the Act provided, without recourse to
actions based on tort. Finding "no adequate basis for the lower court's
conclusion that to deny recovery would be obnoxious to the public policy
of New Hampshire," 52 the Court held that New Hampshire was
required by the full faith and credit clause to uphold the defense of the
Vermont act. Justice Brandeis, for a unanimous Court, further wrote:
A State may, on occasion, decline to enforce a foreign cause of
action. In so doing, it merely denies a remedy, leaving unim-
paired the plaintiff's substantive right, so that he is free to en-
force it elsewhere. But to refuse to give effect to a substantive
defense under the applicable law of another State, as under the
circumstances here presented, subjects the defendant to irremed-
iable liability. This may not be done.1"
The case of Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial of California.5 marks
a departure from the Clapper philosophy."' The Court, weighing the
governmental interests involved, upheld application of the California act
where the injury occurred in Alaska, even though the contract of employ-
ment, which was entered into in California, stipulated that the Alaska
Workmen's Compensation Law would apply. The Court relied upon the
declaration of the Supreme Court of California that it would be contrary
to the policy of California to give effect to the provisions of the Alaska
statute.1 56
The application of California law was also upheld in Pacific
Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Acc. Comm'n,5 7 where the Court
found that the exclusive nature of the Massachusetts act was "obnoxious"
to the policy of California. Justice Stone, speaking for a unanimous Court,
wrote:
The Clapper case cannot be said to have decided more than that
a state statute applicable to employer and employee within the
state, which by its terms provides compensation for the employee
if he is injured in the course of his employment while tem-
porarily in another state, will be given full faith and credit in
152. Id. at 161.
153. Id. at 160.
154. 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
155. Crider v. Zurich Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39, 40 (1965).
156. 294 U.S. 532, 549 (1935).
157. 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
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the latter when not obnoxious to its policy."'
This is the background leading to the Carroll decision. The facts
therein were similar to Clapper, except that the employee had received
payments under the Missouri Compensation Act, the state of residence and
the situs of the contract, and thereafter, a common law action was brought
in Arkansas, the place of injury. There was no evidence that the Missouri
act was obnoxious to the policy of Arkansas. In an opinion by Justice
Douglas, the Court held that Arkansas was free either to adopt Missouri's
policy or to "supplement it or displace it with another, insofar as
remedies for acts occuring within her boundaries are concerned."' 9 It
is abundantly clear that this result is directly contrary to the Clapper
holding, yet the Court did not expressly overrule that case or declare that
it would no longer be regarded as controlling. 6 ° There is no answer to
Justice Frankfurter's criticism that Clapper should have been explicitly
overruled and that it should have been done "with reasons making
manifest why Mr. Justice Brandeis' long-matured, weighty opinion in
that case was ill-founded."16 '
Other overruling cases during the \Varren years may be criticized
on substantive grounds, 6 ' but this is beyond the scope of this article.
The purpose of the foregoing discussion has been to demonstrate that the
Court frequently has given inadequate consideration to the process of
overruling itself. Occasionally, this has resulted in overrulings on inap-
propriate occasions, in unnecessary overruling and in failures to ex-
pressly overrule decisions that can no longer have validity or effect. The
result of such decisions is that the integrity and image of the Court as a
durable institution has needlessly suffered.
CONCLUSION
The most superficial -study of the Supreme Court and our legal
system demonstrates that the Court cannot escape the influence of its own
precedents. Even the most activist judges are influenced by the inter-
pretations of their predecessors and seek to maintain some appearance of
continuity with the past, which, considering the great body of con-
158. Id. at 504.
159. 349 U.S. 408, 413-14 (1955).
160. At least one lower court has found that Clapper was impliedly overruled by
Carroll. Shelby Mut. Ins. Co. v. Girard Steel Supply Co., 224 F. Supp. 690, 696 n.7 (D.
Minn. 1963).
161. 349 U.S. 408, 421-22 (1955).
162. Perhaps Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections. 383 U.S. 663 (1966) and
Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) are particularly subject to such an at-
tack.
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stitutional law, is not an insuperable problem.16 The Court occupies
center stage in a continual dialogue between past and present through
which it is forced "to reexamine in new contexts the validity of the
constitutional positions it has previously taken."' 64 This reexamination
compels the Court to interpret the Constitution in the light of current
conditions and fresh, independent considerations in order that the funda-
mental equilibriums set forth therein be maintained. It is anomalous, but
nevertheless true, that our written Constitution, by permitting an appeal
back to the document itself, increases the Court's discretion and facilitates
the process of change.'6" The Court is thus cast in the role of "the most
philosophical of our political departments""1 ' which confronts it with
formidable problems. Constitutional doctrines necessarily change and
precedents are necessarily overruled, yet this must be accomplished with
due regard for the necessary demands of continuity and with constant
attention to the political and social consequences of each decision. Perhaps
more importantly, the process itself must operate within the traditional
framework of our democratic institutions and judicial mechanism.
The thesis of this article is that the doctrine of stare decisis, sub-
stantially as understood and applied by Justice Frankfurter,6 ' can assist
the Court in this task. The primary function of stare decisis in constitu-
tional law must be to give the Court some guidance with respect to the
properity or impropriety of overruling a particular precedent. Blaustein
and Field have categorized overrulings as "necessary, justified and
unwarranted."'68 Although their analysis constitutes a significant con-
tribution, the real problems lie in fitting a particular case into the
appropriate category. For example, an overruling is necessary where the
precedent results in "great hardship or inconvenience" or where it rests
on "obvious error,"'6 9 but what process should the Court use in making
these judgments? Similarly, overrulings are "justified" where a precedent
163. See genwrally WRIGHT, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 197
(1967) ; Powell, The Logic and Rhetoric of Constitutional Law, 15 J. PHILOSOPHY, PSY-
CHOLOGY AND SCIENTIFIC METHOD 654 (1918). in ESSAYS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 85,
101 (McCloskey ed. 1957). Justice Jackson seriously overstated his case when he wrote
that constitutional law precedents "are the most powerful influence in forming and sup-
porting reactionary opinions." JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 295
(1941). The body of precedents is so great that authorities may be readily cited for
either progressive or reactionary purposes.
164. Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456, 1458 (1954).
165. LEVY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING 43 (1958).
166. JACKSON, supra note 163, at 312-13.
167. It is, of course, possible to subscribe to the Justice's method of analysis with-
out endorsing his position on substantive matters.
168. Blaustein & Field, "Overruling" Opinions in the Supreme Court, 57 MICH. L.
REV. 151, 168-77 (1958).
169. Id. at 168.
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fails to meet the needs of modern conditions or where reconsideration of
prior doctrine prompts the Court to change its views.17 Is the Justice to
weigh only modern conditions or the meaning and history of the con-
stitutional provision in question in making this determination? Apparently
not, since "unwarranted" overrulings include those where the Court fails
to give due consideration and weight to the reasoning and analysis of its
predecessors and to the values underlying the 9tatic element of stare
decisis.'7 The crucial question in this formulation, which demands
resolution, is what constitutes due consideration and weight.
Stare decisis can provide a framework for the analysis of these issues
if the Court is willing to recognize that it is a multi-faceted doctrine that
requires a sophisticated and conscientious weighing of a variety of
factors. Of course, stare decisis is unable to confine the discretion of the
Court within any well-defined boundaries. It can, nevertheless, give the
Court some assurance that the reversal of a constitutional decision is
"rooted in the Constitution itself as an historic document designed for a
developing nation"' 2 and that it is both necessary and timely. The mode
of analysis which the Court should follow can be outlined as follows:
1. The Court should first determine the propriety of
a reversal in the circumstances of the case before it. The
factors to be considered in this regard are:
(a) whether the issue has been fully argued and
briefed;
(b) whether at least five Justices are in favor of
overruling; and
(c) whether a reversal is necessary because the pre-
cedents are not distinguishable on some valid
and meaningful ground, and there are no other
grounds, constitutional or otherwise, for the
decision.
2. Some judgment must be made of the weight to be
accorded to the precedent or precedents involved. The ele-
ments that will influence this judgment include:
170. Id. at 175-76.
171. Id. at 177.
172. Graves v. New York, 306 U.S. 466, 487 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
Aside from stare decisis, of course, the Court must be satisfied that its decisions are
"grounded in reason," Hart, Forward: The Time Chart of the Justice's, 73 HARv. L.
Rav. 84, 99 (1959), and "in their generality and their neutrality transcend any im-
mediate result that is involved." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional
Law, 73 HARv. L. REv. 1, 19 (1959).
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 4, No. 1 [1969], Art. 4
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol4/iss1/4
STARE DECISIS IN THE WARREN YEARS
(a) the age of the doctrine;
(b) the number of cases upholding or applying the
doctrine;
(c) the degree of support that the doctrine has
historically enjoyed; and
(d) the thoroughness with which the doctrine has
been considered in previous cases.
3. The nature of the constitutional question involved
has a bearing on'the weight to be given to prior interpreta-
tions. The Court should analyze the question both with re-
ference to the Brandeis distinction between interpretation and
application and the Frankfurter distinction between technical
and expanding clauses.
4. The Court must find some substantive basis for
reversal. Its attention should be directed, for example, to
any:
(a) new history or learning which casts doubt on the
validity of the prior rule;
(b) new economic and political conditions which
render the rule unfit for continued application;
(c) new policies or philosophies which undermine
the doctrine's logical foundation; and
(d) unfavorable experience with the rule.
5. Finally, the Court must be constantly aware of the
consequences of the alternative courses. These include:
(a) the practical consequences of a failure to overrule;
(b) the logical consequences of the new doctrine; and
(c) the practical consequences of an overruling. 3
Obviousiy, no one factor or group of factors can or should be
determinative. One searches in vain for hard and fast rules in this area.
Nevertheless, the method of analysis recommended will direct the Court's
attention to those considerations that should be uppermost in its mind
when a question concerning the validity of a constitutional doctrine comes
before it. If this intellectual process is not followed and made evident in
the Court's opinions, we have no assurance that a Justice is not merely
173. TheCourt, as a maker of fundamental policy, cannot escape responsibility for
the consequences of its decisions. It is, therefore, not only legitimate, but essential, for
it "to inquire into the advisability of its end product in terms of the long-range interest
of the country." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 474, 531-32 (1966) (White, J., dissent-
ing). See generally Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17 (1924).
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reading his own personal preferences into the Constitution. It is impos-
sible, of course, to purge the personal element from judicial decision-
making. On the other hand, the notion that the Court is checked only by
its "own sense of self-restraint"'7 4 misses the mark.' The appellate
process and our adversary tradition subject the judge to a number of
restraints. For example, the need to arrive at a collective judgment and to
explain the decision in an opinion that will withstand critical analysis.'
The reversal of a constitutional doctrine must be justified in under-
standable terms to the parties, the legal profession and the public, especially
where the Court is reversing a case that previously upheld congressional
or state power."
A further reason for respecting stare decisis in constitutional ad-
judication is that the innovations of the Court must be interstitial and
incremental in nature. As popular awareness that the Court does not
declare law grows, this may become increasingly essential to the main-
tenance of the Court's independence, status and moral sanction. 7 ' The
problem was well stated by Justice Jackson as follows:
Unless the assumption is substantially true that cases will be
disposed of by application of known principles and previously
disclosed courses of reasoning, our common-law process would
become the most intolerable kind of ex post facto judicial law-
making. Moderation in change is all that makes judicial par-
ticipation in the evolution of the law tolerable. Either judges
must be fettered to mere application of a legislative code with a
minimum of discretion, as in continental systems, or they must
formulate and adhere to some voluntary principles that will
impart stability and predictability to judicial discretion. To
overrule an important precedent is serious business. It calls for
sober appraisal of the disadvantages of the innovation as well as
those of the questioned case, a weighing of practical effects of
one against the other.'
174. United States v. .Butler, 297 U.S. 1. 79 (1936) (Stone, J., dissenting).
175. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402 (1936) (Sutherland,
J., dissenting).
176. Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the
Function of Review and the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 555 (1969). For a
criticism of Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.
483 (1954), see MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 216 (1963).
177. Sachs, Stare Decisis and the Legal Tender Cases, 20 VA. L. REV. 856, 884
(1934).
178. See Carrington, supra note 176, at 552. Stated differently, the dilemma is that
"the Court must face up to the political implications of cases it decides, and, at the same
time. keep alive the ideal, the mystery, the magic that it is the law speaking." Mason,
Book Review, 82 HARV. L. REv. 714, 717 (1969).
179. Jackson, Decisional Law and Stare Decisis, 30 A.B.A.J. 334 (1944).
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If the overrulings of the Warren years are subject to any general
criticism, it is that they have seemingly been rendered without an
appraisal of all the factors and interests involved. The vision of the
Court, perhaps as a result of its failure to recognize the proper role of
stare decisis in constitutional cases, has frequently been too narrow. As a
consequence, its overrulings are subject to objection for reasons that are
unrelated to the substantive changes announced. This unnecessarily
weakens the authority of the Court. The need is for a more catholic
approach to the problem of overruling that will avoid procedural objec-
tions and that will give the Court a greater awareness of the value of its
own precedents, the necessity for growth and change and the long-range
consequences of its decisions. So long as the Court is exercising the
Judicial Power under Article III of the Constitution, it can give, and we
can demand, no less.
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